t
115
4
It was further stated that, in the opinion of the Macao
Government, this offer, if accepted, would mean prosperity
for that Colony although the fear was expressed that it might
also mean virtually Japanese control of the territory.
further details are given in an appendix to the report.
Strategic aspects.
Some
5. Macao is approximately 40 miles from Hong Kong and, it is
claimed, has excellent aerodrome sites. It would, therefore,
be of considerable value to the Japanese from the point of view
of attacks on Hong Kong in the event of war with this country
more particularly as a base for fighter aircraft for the
purpose of obtaining air superiority over the Hong Kong area.
6. Fighter aircraft, if they could not be flown direct to
Macao, could be flown off aircraft carriers to previously
prepared landing grounds at the beginning of hostilities.
types of aircraft could, if required, fly direct to Macao from
Japanese bases in Formosa, which is only just over 400 miles away.
77. The acquisition of air facilities at Macao by the Japanese
would necessitate the reconsideration of our existing air
Other
strength at Hong Kong.
strong, we should be in a position to dominate Macao from the
outset and it would, therefore, be of little value to Japan as
an air base. Without an adequate air garrison at Hong Kong,
however, the converse would apply.
If our air garrison was sufficiently
8.
If the Japanese were to establish themselves at Macao it
would be necessary to review also the scale of anti-aircraft
equipment at present provided for Hong Kong, and another point
to be taken into account is the fact that the sea routes along
which the Navy must pass to reach or operate from Hong Kong
would be within short range of shore-based air attack.
9. The sites in South China from which air action against
Hong Kong and the adjacent sea routes has up to the present
been anticipated are Swatow, Suabue and Pinghoi, some 180, 70
-2-
No comments yet.
Private notes are available after approval.